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ABSTRACT—Hornbook constitutional law establishes that Congress and 
state legislatures are bodies of limited, enumerated powers, and common 
sense suggests they should get their act together and exercise them more 
often. But should legislators be permitted to sue in order to exercise their 
powers when another branch of government infringes on them 
unconstitutionally, or the body they represent unconstitutionally limits 
them? This Note argues that, at least in certain circumstances, they should. 
Following on the heels of the Tenth Circuit’s recent treatment of the issue 
in its Kerr v. Hickenlooper decisions, this Note proposes a redefinition of 
the legislator standing doctrine under which legislators can sue to remedy 
unconstitutional infringement of specific, enumerated powers. In doing so, 
this Note argues that prudential concerns that have historically barred 
legislators from suing should be disregarded, not only because the Supreme 
Court signaled as much in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., but also because these concerns are normatively ill 
considered. Rather, tying legislators’ injuries in fact to enumerated powers 
better aligns standing for legislators with standing for everyone else, while 
helping ensure courts are not stuck hearing suits they cannot and should not 
hear.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Lawsuits by legislators in federal court present perplexing, if rarely 
discussed, questions of justiciability. “Legislator standing” refers to the 
conditions under which courts will entertain lawsuits by legislators, not in 
legislators’ individual capacities, but in their official roles as 
representatives of the people. Legislators’ claims typically allege a serious 
threat to democratic principles or the separation of powers.1 Where 
legislators seek to challenge actions of the executive, however, courts are 
often wary of hearing their claims due to the political question doctrine2 or 
other separation of powers concerns.3 Indeed, courts often refuse to 
entertain legislators’ claims on these grounds.4 In this sense, the legislator 
standing doctrine seeks to balance two evils: constitutional infringement on 
1 As an example, in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), the Supreme Court’s most prominent 
decision on legislator standing, the legislators’ purported injury—dilution of their voting power, 
effectuated by President Clinton’s use of the Line Item Veto Act—would arguably amount to an 
instance at which presidential power is at its “lowest ebb,” and separation of powers concerns are most 
pronounced. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring in the judgment). For a discussion of Raines, see infra Part II.B.1. 
2 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 3531.11.2, at 135 (3d ed. 2008) (observing that the Supreme Court’s legislator 
standing jurisprudence reflects “standing informed—and indeed virtually controlled—by political-
question concerns”); see also Adam L. Blank, Raines v. Byrd: A Death Knell for the Congressional 
Suit?, 49 MERCER L. REV. 609, 623 (1998) (discussing the Court’s conflation of Article III standing 
requirements and other aspects of justiciability and concluding that “the Court has employed standing 
as a convenient method to dismiss politically-oriented cases it does not want to decide on the merits”). 
3 David J. Weiner, Note, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205, 207 (2001) 
(“Standing and the separation of powers doctrine have long been wedded together; a robust standing 
doctrine makes it more difficult for litigants to use the federal courts and therefore precludes their 
seizure of political power.”). 
4 Cf. id. (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Raines v. Byrd as resting largely on separation 
of powers concerns, specifically a desire “to protect courts from deciding the types of cases most likely 
to threaten their legitimacy”). 
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the legislative role, on the one hand, and infringement on the judicial role 
by way of legislator lawsuits, on the other. 
The core of the legislator standing doctrine—as addressed most 
recently in the Court’s 2015 decision in Arizona State Legislature v. 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission5—consists of the Court’s 
two prior decisions in Coleman v. Miller6 and Raines v. Byrd.7 These cases 
stand for three important propositions. First, as demonstrated in Coleman 
and acknowledged in Raines, legislators can have standing to sue as 
legislators for institutional, rather than personal, injuries, at least in some 
circumstances.8 Second, while it remains unclear exactly what these 
circumstances are, Raines dramatically narrows the ambit of legislator 
standing to instances in which legislators can demonstrate that their votes 
have been nullified and the legislators have not suffered a mere “abstract 
dilution of institutional legislative power.”9 Finally, Raines envisions a 
number of additional factors as relevant to the legislator standing inquiry, 
including whether the alleged legislative injury is redressable by ordinary 
legislative means, whether an ordinary, private citizen might bring suit 
instead, and whether the suit has the support of the legislative body 
involved in the case.10 These factors are intended to inform a court’s 
understanding of whether the separation of powers or political question 
doctrine would counsel against reaching the merits of the legislators’ suit.  
Recently, in Kerr v. Hickenlooper (Kerr I), the Tenth Circuit initially 
affirmed,11 and then denied,12 standing to a group of legislators bringing 
suit in their official capacities. The legislators in Kerr challenged the 
constitutionality of Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR) under the 
Guarantee Clause and a number of other constitutional and statutory 
provisions.13 The legislators asserted that they had been deprived of their 
ability to vote in favor of tax increases or tax policy changes, which 
TABOR requires to be approved by popular vote, in violation of the 
5 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
6 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
7 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
8 Id. at 823; Coleman, 307 U.S. at 437–38. 
9 Raines, 521 U.S. at 826; see id. at 823 (“[O]ur holding in Coleman stands []at most . . . for the 
proposition that legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific 
legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), 
on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.” (citation omitted)). 
10 See id. at 829–30. As discussed infra notes 143–44, the relevant inquiry is whether legislators 
have the support of a majority of the legislative chamber concerned. 
11 744 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (mem.). 
12 Kerr v. Hickenlooper (Kerr II), No. 12-1445, 2016 WL 3126203, at *1 (10th Cir. June 3, 2016). 
13 Kerr I, 744 F.3d at 1161. 
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Constitution’s guarantee of a republican form of government.14 A three-
judge panel of the Tenth Circuit initially reasoned that “it would be a 
bizarre result if the nullification of a single vote supported legislative 
standing, but the nullification of a legislator’s authority to cast a large 
number of votes did not.”15 Later, after the Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded Kerr after deciding Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission,16 the Tenth Circuit changed its 
mind, holding the legislators could not sue on their purported institutional 
injury.17  
Kerr highlights two specific problems in the doctrine of legislator 
standing. First, Kerr suggests that the vote nullification–abstract dilution of 
power paradigm in Raines fails to provide discernible guidance to lower 
courts. In particular, courts differ on whether deprivation of the right to 
vote—as opposed to nullification of a recorded vote—merits standing. This 
is borne out by comparing Kerr with decisions of the D.C. Circuit 
immediately following Raines, as well as other courts’ skepticism of 
legislator standing following Raines. Second, Kerr demonstrates that the 
additional standing requirements the Court considered in Raines are 
difficult to interpret, of questionable relevance in certain situations in 
which legislators might bring suit in federal court, and fail to accurately 
inform courts’ consideration of separation of powers, the political question 
doctrine, and Article III. 
This Note proposes a reformulation of the legislator standing doctrine. 
It begins by critiquing vote nullification, which provides a deficient 
approximation of the legislative function. It then suggests that the 
additional considerations the Court has attached in evaluating legislator 
standing cases should be abandoned for two reasons. First, the Court has 
recently signaled in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc.,18 that prudential considerations should not influence the 
standing inquiry. Therefore, insofar as these considerations are prudential 
in nature, courts should not use them as a means of considering the 
standing of legislators. Second, even if these considerations are not 
prudential, they are ill conceived, and thus should not be valid 
considerations in the first place. 
If these prudential considerations have no bearing, the inquiry should 
return to the bedrock requirement of Article III: an injury in fact. In turn, 
14 Id. at 1162–63. 
15 Id. at 1170. 
16 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).  
17 Kerr II, No. 12-1445, 2016 WL 3126203, at *1 (10th Cir. June 3, 2016). 
18 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
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this Note argues that courts should distinguish between two different 
permutations of alleged vote nullification—deprivation of an opportunity to 
vote and improper execution of a successful vote—recognizing an injury in 
fact only in the former case, where legislators have been unlawfully 
deprived of an opportunity to vote pursuant to an enumerated power. In 
such cases, legislators assert a cognizable injury under Article III. While 
this will have the effect of increasing the numbers of injuries in fact 
recognized, the other requirements of Article III standing—traceability and 
redressability—as well as ripeness, mootness, and the political question 
doctrine, can assist in identifying those legislator suits that should be 
nonjusticiable. 
Part I of this Note begins by surveying basic justiciability, including 
discussions of Article III standing, prudential standing, ripeness, mootness, 
and the political question doctrine. Part I then provides an overview of the 
law of legislator standing, beginning with Coleman and Raines and then 
collecting the decisions of circuit courts interpreting Raines. Part II 
synthesizes the modern approach to legislator standing based on these 
decisions. It highlights the lack of clarity Raines has provided for lower 
courts, and then identifies problems with the vote nullification–abstract 
dilution of the institutional legislative power paradigm and the additional 
factors considered relevant for the purposes of legislator standing. Finally, 
Part III proposes a reformulation of the legislator standing doctrine that 
eliminates these extra factors and refocuses the injury in fact inquiry on 
legislators’ enumerated powers. 
I. FOUNDATIONS OF LEGISLATOR STANDING
This Part briefly overviews fundamental aspects of justiciability, 
beginning with a synopsis of Article III and prudential standing 
requirements, ripeness, mootness, and a short discussion of the political 
question doctrine and its relationship to standing. This overview 
emphasizes recent Supreme Court decisions that address standing, which 
may impact legislator standing more specifically in ways that have not yet 
been explored. Additionally, this overview aims to differentiate the 
standing inquiry from that under the political question doctrine, a 
distinction that courts’ analyses of legislator standing often blur. 
This Part then surveys legislator standing jurisprudence, including the 
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, the Tenth Circuit’s decisions in Kerr, and other decisions of 
import for the legislator standing doctrine. 
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A. Justiciability
1. Article III Standing.—From Article III’s limited grant of federal
jurisdiction to cases or controversies,19 the Supreme Court has derived three 
irreducible requirements that a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to 
establish standing to bring a lawsuit in federal court.20 These requirements 
are (1) the plaintiff has suffered a cognizable “injury in fact” to a legally 
protected interest, (2) the plaintiff’s injury is fairly traceable to the 
defendant’s conduct, and (3) a favorable judgment will likely redress the 
plaintiff’s injury.21 
Legislator standing jurisprudence focuses most closely on the injury in 
fact requirement.22 In the broader standing context, the Court has used 
various narrowing modifiers to describe the requisite nature of an alleged 
injury. First, an injury cognizable under Article III must be 
“particularized,” meaning that a plaintiff must allege personal harm.23 This 
serves in part to ensure that the party seeking to invoke the court’s 
jurisdiction will adequately represent the interest the party seeks to 
protect.24 Additionally, an injury must be “‘real and immediate,’ not 
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”25 This prevents a court from issuing an 
advisory opinion, which it cannot do under Article III’s case-or-
19 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The case-or-controversy requirement both prevents courts from issuing 
premature, “advisory” opinions that do not affect “live” rights and ensures adequate adverseness 
between the parties before a court, such that litigants aggressively represent their own interests and do 
not inadequately represent outside parties with similar (or more directly affected) interests. See Lea 
Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 300, 302 (1979). 
20 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 471–72 (1982). 
21 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
22 The issue in Raines v. Byrd centered on whether the congressional members’ alleged injury—
diminution of their voting power—was a sufficiently cognizable injury in fact. 521 U.S. 811, 820–21 
(1997). Similarly, in Kerr v. Hickenlooper, the issue was not whether the Colorado state legislators’ 
injury was fairly traceable to TABOR or redressable by judicial decision, but whether the legislators 
met the injury in fact requirement. 744 F.3d 1156, 1163–71 (10th Cir. 2014) (analyzing the legislators’ 
injury in fact in great detail, and then concluding with only a very brief discussion of the traceability 
and redressability requirements), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (mem.). 
23 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1 (“By 
particularized, we mean that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”). 
24 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (“[Standing] assures an actual factual setting in which the litigant 
asserts a claim of injury in fact, [such that] a court may decide the case with some confidence that its 
decision will not pave the way for lawsuits which have some, but not all, of the facts of the case 
actually decided by the court.”); see also Brilmayer, supra note 19, at 310 (“The case or controversy 
requirement guarantees that the individuals most affected by the challenged activity will have a role in 
the challenge.”). 
25 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). 
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controversy limitation.26 In this way, the injury in fact requirement also 
concerns proper respect for the separation of powers, because it limits the 
province of the federal courts to the role provided for in Article III.27 To 
that end, the Court more recently reaffirmed that an injury cannot be too 
speculative and must at least be “certainly impending,” if it has not already 
manifested.28 
Legislators must also satisfy Article III’s traceability and 
redressability requirements, although these considerations have not driven 
courts’ legislator standing analyses.29 These requirements nevertheless 
deserve brief discussion. Traceability is synonymous with causation and 
asks whether the party charged has indeed caused the alleged injury.30 
Redressability, on the other hand, seeks to determine whether a court is 
properly positioned to provide a remedy for an alleged wrong.31 The 
traceability and redressability requirements also serve to help realize the 
adverseness and separation of powers concerns underlying the case-or-
controversy requirement.32 
2. Prudential Standing.—In addition to Article III’s irreducible
bedrock of standing, federal courts have historically applied additional 
limitations to the circumstances in which litigants can bring suit in federal 
court.33 These “prudential standing” limitations include bars on hearing 
“generalized grievances,”34 claims that fall outside the “zone of interests” 
26 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (explaining that requiring an injury in fact follows from the case-
or-controversy requirement by “tend[ing] to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be 
resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context 
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action”). 
27 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983) (“[T]he law of standing roughly restricts courts to 
their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the 
majority, and excludes them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two 
branches should function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself.” (emphasis omitted)). 
28 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).  
29 See supra note 22; see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 n.11 (1997) (noting the 
legislators’ injuries may also not have satisfied the traceability requirement). 
30 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387–88 (2014). 
31 Id. at 753 n.19. 
32 Id. at 759–61. 
33 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2004) (denying standing 
to a litigant based on prudential, as opposed to Article III, considerations), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, 
134 S. Ct. at 1387–88. For a discussion of prudential standing’s impact on legislator standing, 
particularly in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, see infra Part II. 
34 A generalized grievance consists of an injury “shared in substantially equal measure by all or a 
large class of citizens.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Where a litigant raises only a 
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of a particular statute,35 and suits raising another’s rights or interests (or 
third-party standing).36 
Importantly, because prudential standing requirements are not based in 
Article III, but are instead judicially imposed, prudential requirements are 
subject both to Congressional abrogation and judicial revision.37 And on the 
latter basis, a recent Court decision raises serious questions about—if not 
heralding the end of—the prudential standing doctrine. In Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,38 the Court 
unanimously declined to apply the zone of interests test as a matter of 
prudential standing.39 Additionally, in a footnote, Justice Scalia raised 
doubt as to whether concerns traditionally labeled prudential standing 
should any longer be considered as such.40 The decision in Lexmark, 
however, follows two recent decisions in which the Court discussed issues 
of prudential standing.41 Read together, these cases fail to provide perfect 
generalized grievance, the Court has suggested the political, rather than judicial, process provides a 
more appropriate remedy. Id. at 500. 
35 The zone of interests test asks “whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is 
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing 
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). 
36 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
37 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (first citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; and then citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 
498, 501).  
38 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
39 Id. at 1387 (“Whether a plaintiff comes within ‘the “zone of interests”’ is an issue that requires 
us to determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred 
cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim. . . . ‘“[P]rudential standing” is a misnomer’ 
as applied to the zone-of-interests analysis, which asks whether ‘this particular class of persons ha[s] a 
right to sue under this substantive statute.’” (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (first quoting 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998); and then quoting Ass’n of Battery 
Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 675–76 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring))). 
40 Id. at 1387 n.3. Justice Scalia first remarked that complaints of generalized grievances do not 
raise genuine cases or controversies under Article III, and thus should be understood as constitutionally, 
and not prudentially, nonjusticiable. Id. Then, because the case “[did] not present any issue of third-
party standing,” Justice Scalia elected not to address “the doctrine’s proper place in the standing 
firmament.” Id. 
41 The first case is Hollingsworth v. Perry, in which the Court declined to recognize standing for a 
group of state constitutional amendment proponents who sought to intervene and defend the 
amendment, which had been declared unconstitutional. 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659, 2660–61 (2013). The 
Court reasoned that, because the proponents’ alleged injury was nothing more than a generalized 
grievance, it did not create a genuine case or controversy. Id. at 2662–63. Interestingly, the Court did 
not mention prudential standing in determining the alleged injury was a generalized grievance, which is 
consistent with Justice Scalia’s treatment of generalized grievances in Lexmark. See id.; see also supra 
note 40. The second case is United States v. Windsor, decided the same day, in which the Court 
recognized standing for the United States, with a group of members of the House or Representatives 
intervening, in appealing a decision holding the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional. 
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688–89 (2013). Unlike its approach in Hollingsworth and Lexmark, the Court openly 
recognized the relevance of prudential concerns, particularly regarding the legislators’ standing. Id. at 
2686–88. The gist of these concerns stemmed from whether the legislators would provide sufficient 
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clarity on the future of prudential standing, but suggest at minimum a 
growing wariness among members of the Court in denying standing based 
on prudential grounds.42 
3. Ripeness and Mootness.—Like the Article III requirements of
traceability and redressability, courts have not engaged with the ripeness or 
mootness doctrines in considering legislators’ standing. Still, ripeness and 
mootness are relevant to the reformulation of legislator standing discussed 
below, and brief definition is therefore necessary. 
Ripeness asks whether issues parties present to a court are fit for 
judicial decision, and whether the parties would face hardship if the court 
were to withhold consideration until a later time.43 If issues are not fit for 
decision and the parties would not face undue hardship, a case is not ripe, 
and therefore not justiciable. The purpose of ripeness is akin to Article III’s 
case-or-controversy requirement: to prevent a court from engaging in 
debate over abstract disputes when judicial decision is not yet appropriate.44 
Mootness, on the other hand, weighs against a court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction where “[t]he controversy between the parties has . . . clearly 
ceased to be ‘definite and concrete’ and no longer ‘touch[es] the legal 
relations of parties having adverse legal interests.’”45 Like ripeness, 
therefore, mootness reflects the absence of a live case or controversy.46 
4. The Political Question Doctrine.—The political question doctrine
is arguably relevant in virtually every instance a legislator brings suit.47 The 
doctrine presents different questions, however, from those typically raised 
in the standing inquiry, at least as far as Article III is concerned.48 Thus, 
“adversarial presentation of the issues.” Id. at 2687. The Court nevertheless found that the legislators’ 
“sharp adversarial presentation” mollified these concerns. Id. at 2688. 
42 If the Court is indeed seeking to distance itself from the prudential standing doctrine, this move 
may have a significant impact on how federal courts should treat legislator standing, on which 
prudential concerns have traditionally had commanding influence. See infra Parts II–III.  
43 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 
430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). 
44 Id. at 148–49. For a discussion of the relationship between ripeness and Article III’s case-or-
controversy requirement that concludes ripeness is not required by, and is in fact inconsistent with, the 
case-or-controversy requirement, see Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 153 (1987). 
45 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317 (1974) (third alteration in original) (quoting Aetna Life 
Ins. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–241 (1937)). 
46 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 63 (7th ed. 2011); see 
also Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373, 376 (1974) (observing 
that the mootness doctrine asks “whether an actual controversy continues to exist”). 
47 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
48 This Note will focus on legislator standing while aiming to differentiate standing questions from 
those that arise under the political question doctrine. To that end, it is necessary here to briefly 
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courts typically consider the standing of legislators, and then proceed to 
consider whether the political question doctrine provides an independent 
rationale for finding a suit nonjusticiable.49 
Like prudential standing, the political question doctrine is a judicial 
construct.50 As one might expect, the doctrine excludes from judicial 
decision questions best left to the political process or political resolution. 
Whether a question is political depends on evaluation of a multifactor test 
the Court announced in the seminal case of Baker v. Carr: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is 
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments on one question.51 
At least one of these considerations must be present for the political 
question doctrine to apply.52 Thus, for example, the Court has recognized 
the applicability of the doctrine to the issue of what constitutes trying 
impeachments under Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of the U.S. 
Constitution53—largely under Baker’s textually demonstrable commitment 
and lack of a judicially discoverable and manageable standard for 
resolution prongs54—as well as the doctrine’s bar on examining the actions 
of the military during Japanese internment in World War II55—there in an 
effort to show proper respect to coordinate branches of government.56 
Additionally, the Court has in some instances categorically barred suits 
summarize the political question doctrine in order to situate the doctrine in the context of a wider 
reformulation of legislator standing. See infra Parts II–III.  
49 In Kerr, for example, the Tenth Circuit first considered the legislators’ standing and only then 
proceeded to consider the applicability of the political question doctrine. See infra note 117 and 
accompanying text.  
50 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 40–42 (1849). In Luther, the Court refused to issue an 
opinion on the merits in a dispute between competing governments in the State of Rhode Island. Id. The 
Court determined that “the political department has always determined whether the proposed 
constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has 
followed its decision.” Id. at 39. 
51 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
52 Id. 
53 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1993). 
54 Id. at 229–38. 
55 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944). 
56 Id. 
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under certain constitutional provisions on the basis of the political question 
doctrine.57 
The rationale for the political doctrine is a tortured question largely 
beyond the scope of this Note.58 Suffice it to say for present purposes that 
whatever the proper rationale for the doctrine—whether it be doubts about 
the competence and capacity of courts to decide political questions,59 or 
fear that the public will misunderstand judicial decisions touching on 
political issues,60 or some other purpose—the doctrine is here to stay as a 
justiciability concern lurking behind any account of legislator standing. 
B. Legislator Standing Jurisprudence
1. Coleman and Raines.—The Supreme Court has shaped the
doctrine of legislator standing through two primary cases. First, in Coleman 
v. Miller,61 the Court appraised the standing of a majority of Kansas state
legislators to challenge the state’s ratification of an amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The legislators challenging ratification had voted against the
amendment, but the overall vote resulted in a tie, which Kansas’s lieutenant
governor broke in favor of ratification.62 The legislators asserted that this
tie-breaking maneuver violated proper legislative process.63 The Court
concluded that the legislators should have standing as the suit implicated
the “plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of
their votes,” also noting that the legislators’ “votes against ratification have
57 One such categorical bar is of import to this Note. In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 
(1849), and Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), the Court refused to hear 
claims arising under the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, on the basis of the 
political question doctrine. Luther, 48 U.S. at 42; Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 151. These cases are the 
basis of the traditional understanding that claims arising under the Guarantee Clause raise nonjusticiable 
political questions. Then, in Baker v. Carr, the Court affirmed the decisions in Luther and Pacific 
States, but did so on the basis that the cases raised issues pertaining to the aforementioned political 
question doctrine factors. 369 U.S. 186, 217–18, 222 & n.48, 228 (1962). It is not clear, therefore, 
whether Baker sustained the categorical political question doctrine bar on Guarantee Clause claims. 
Later, in New York v. United States, the Court stated in dicta that “perhaps not all claims under the 
Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions.” 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992). Based on Baker 
and New York, the Tenth Circuit decided that the Guarantee Clause claims raised in Kerr v. 
Hickenlooper, which this Note discusses in detail, did not present categorically nonjusticiable political 
questions. 744 F.3d 1156, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (mem.). 
58 For an overview and critique of competing rationales for the political question doctrine, and an 
argument that the political question doctrine should never influence a federal court’s determination of 
whether a case is nonjusticiable, see Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 
79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031 (1984). 
59 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 184 (2d ed. 1986). 
60 See id. 
61 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
62 Id. at 435–36. 
63 Id. at 436.  
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been overridden and virtually held for naught although if [the legislators] 
are right in their contentions their votes would have been sufficient to 
defeat ratification.”64 
Following Coleman, the Court did not consider the issue of legislator 
standing for nearly sixty years, until its decision in Raines v. Byrd.65 In 
Raines, six members of Congress challenged the constitutionality of the 
Line Item Veto Act,66 arguing the President’s ability to veto specific 
appropriations provisions from validly enacted laws diminished their 
constitutionally prescribed voting power.67 Importantly, the Court narrowed 
Coleman’s precedential force to “the proposition that legislators whose 
votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative 
Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does 
not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely 
nullified.”68 The Court further stated that “[t]here is a vast difference 
between the level of vote nullification at issue in Coleman and the abstract 
dilution of institutional legislative power that is alleged here.”69 Because 
the Members of Congress “[had] not alleged that they voted for a specific 
bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the bill was 
nonetheless deemed defeated,” the Court denied the Members of Congress 
standing.70 
2. Legislator Standing Post-Raines.—Post-Raines, several lower
federal courts have considered the standing of legislators bringing suit in 
their institutional capacities, although decisions on the subject have been 
relatively infrequent. Many decisions in the wake of Raines have come 
from the D.C. Circuit,71 although select other circuits have issued opinions 
64 Id. at 438.  
65 521 U.S. 811 (1997).  
66 The Line Item Veto Act provided, in relevant part, that “the President may, with respect to any 
bill or joint resolution that has been signed into law pursuant to Article I, section 7, of the Constitution 
of the United States, cancel in whole—(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any 
item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit,” subject to certain specified conditions and 
procedural requirements. 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (1996), invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York, 
524 U.S. 417 (1998). The Act further provided, pursuant to § 691b(a), that Congress could pass 
“disapproval bills” that would render any presidential cancellation “null and void.” Id. § 691b(a). 
67 Raines, 521 U.S. at 816. 
68 Id. at 823. 
69 Id. at 826. 
70 Id. at 824. 
71 See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Alaska Legislative Council v. 
Babbitt, 181 F.3d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The 
high number of D.C. Circuit cases stems from the fact that many legislator lawsuits—including 
Campbell and Chenoweth—involve Congress. The issues relevant in these cases, notably separation of 
powers concerns, differ from those where state legislators bring suit. See infra note 172 and 
accompanying text. 
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discussing or applying Raines.72 Most of these decisions were issued in the 
first five years following Raines. Following these early decisions, very few 
reported cases concern legislator standing.73 The last three years, however, 
have produced at least three cases that raise important new questions about 
legislator standing.74 
A majority of courts that have applied Raines, especially those 
applying Raines in the five years following its issue, have strictly applied 
Raines’s vote nullification standard and concluded that the legislator 
plaintiffs at issue lacked standing to bring their claims.75 A leading example 
is Campbell v. Clinton, in which the D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of 
standing to members of Congress who alleged President Clinton had 
violated the War Powers Resolution and the War Powers Clause of the 
Constitution by involving U.S. troops in a NATO campaign in 
Yugoslavia.76 The members of Congress argued that, by failing to submit a 
report pursuant to the War Powers Resolution and giving Congress an 
opportunity to decide whether U.S. military involvement should continue, 
the President effectively nullified a prior vote in which Congress had 
chosen not to declare war.77 The D.C. Circuit panel disagreed, reasoning 
that the members of Congress “enjoy[ed] ample legislative power” to 
remedy their alleged injury,78 and therefore denied standing under Raines.79 
72 See, e.g., Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2001); Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119 (8th 
Cir. 1999). 
73 See, e.g., Russell v. DeJongh, 491 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2007); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 
110 (D.D.C. 2011). 
74 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015); United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Kerr I, 744 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 
2927 (2015) (mem.). 
75 The D.C. Circuit has led the charge, starting with Chenoweth. In Chenoweth, members of the 
House of Representatives challenged a presidential executive order, alleging that the order impinged on 
“their constitutionally guaranteed responsibility of open debate and vote on [certain] issues and 
legislation.” 181 F.3d at 113. After surveying circuit approaches to legislator standing pre-Raines, 
which more readily afforded standing to legislators, the court concluded that the members’ alleged 
injury was nothing more than the abstract dilution of authority proscribed in Raines. Id. at 114–16. For 
treatment generally skeptical of legislator standing post-Raines in other circuits, see, for example, 
Russell, 491 F.3d at 135–38 (denying standing to a Senator of the Virgin Islands whose alleged injury 
amounted to nothing more than “seeing that the law is followed,” and who had legislative remedies 
available); Baird, 266 F.3d at 413 (denying standing to Michigan state legislators on the basis that they 
could not show they had cast specific votes that had been nullified). But see Miller, 169 F.3d at 1122–
23 (recognizing standing for a Nebraska state legislator to challenge a Nebraska state ballot measure 
that “threaten[ed] his political career and livelihood,” thereby creating an “individualized, concrete 
injury” distinguishable from that lacking in Raines). 
76 203 F.3d at 20, 24. 
77 Id. at 20. Congress voted not to declare war but did not take action to stop the President’s initial 
decision to send troops to Yugoslavia, even funding the effort. Id. 
78 Id. at 23. These means were thought to consist of passing a resolution opposing the President’s 
actions or defunding his efforts. Id. 
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Three noteworthy decisions of the past three years, however, have 
applied Raines and recognized the standing of legislators to bring suit. The 
first is United States v. Windsor, which concerned a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).80 The case 
raised the issue of the standing of an entity called the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group (BLAG), a group of members of the House of 
Representatives that sought to intervene on appeal to defend the 
constitutionality of DOMA.81 While a majority of the Supreme Court 
elected not to address the BLAG’s standing independent of the Executive 
(the named defendant in the suit),82 Justices Alito and Scalia addressed the 
BLAG’s standing in dissenting opinions.83 
Justice Alito would have recognized the BLAG’s standing,84 but 
disagreed with the majority’s holding that DOMA is unconstitutional.85 
Justice Alito reasoned that, under Coleman and Raines, lower courts’ 
finding DOMA unconstitutional nullified the votes of members of the 
House of Representatives required to enact DOMA, thereby creating a 
cognizable injury in fact.86 Justice Alito’s dissent also framed the injury-in-
fact inquiry somewhat more broadly, however, as requiring only a showing 
of a “limit[ation on] Congress’ power to legislate.”87 Justice Scalia, on the 
other hand, disagreed that the BLAG’s intervention created a justiciable 
case or controversy.88 His dissent took particular issue with Justice Alito’s 
“theory of jurisdiction,” finding Justice Alito’s conclusion and method 
contrary to Raines,89 and reaffirming Justice Scalia’s long-held position that 
79 Id. at 23–24. The Campbell panel was not unanimous on the standing question. Rather, Judge 
Randolph wrote separately to challenge the panel’s interpretation of Raines, arguing that “the majority’s 
decision is tantamount to a decision abolishing legislative standing.” Id. at 32 (Randolph, J., concurring 
in the judgment). Judge Randolph took particular issue with the panel’s conflation of vote nullification 
and the ability to remedy an alleged legislative injury with a future vote, arguing the latter is not 
inconsistent with the former. Id. Ultimately, he would have denied standing, but only because the 
legislators failed to articulate in their pleadings precisely the injury for which they sought a remedy. Id. 
at 33. 
80 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013). 
81 Id. at 2684. The House gave the BLAG license to speak for the institution in the case. H.R. 5, 
113th Cong. § 4(a)(1)(B) (2013). 
82 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688. As previously discussed, see supra note 41, the majority relied in 
part on the “BLAG’s sharp adversarial presentation of the issues” in the case in holding that prudential 
concerns should not bar the Court from hearing the appeal. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688. 
83 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711–14 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2703–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 2712 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. at 2720. 
86 Id. at 2713–14. 
87 Id. at 2712. 
88 See id. at 2700–01 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
89 See id. at 2703–04. 
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the judiciary should have no part in resolving disputes between the 
President and Congress.90 
The second recent case of import for the legislator standing doctrine is 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, in which the Court recognized the standing of the Arizona 
State Legislature to challenge the constitutionality of a voter-created 
independent redistricting commission.91 Writing for a five-Justice 
majority,92 Justice Ginsburg found that creation of the commission 
“strip[ped] the Legislature of its alleged prerogative to initiate 
redistricting,” and thus was a cognizable injury for standing purposes.93 
Rejecting arguments that the Arizona legislature should have to attempt to 
adopt redistricting measures to attain standing, the Court found sufficient 
injury in the legislature’s inability to adopt redistricting measures without 
violating the state constitution and the voter proposition creating the 
commission.94 In doing so, the Court distinguished Raines on the basis that 
the Arizona legislature “commenced [the] action after authorizing votes in 
both of its chambers,” demonstrating institutional endorsement.95 To that 
end, the Court likened the Arizona legislature’s injury to that in Coleman, 
holding that the commission’s existence “‘completely nullif[ied]’ any vote 
by the [Arizona] Legislature, now or ‘in the future,’ purporting to adopt a 
redistricting plan.”96 Accordingly, despite ultimately deciding against the 
90 Id. at 2704–05. See generally Scalia, supra note 27. 
91 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665–66 (2015).  
92 Of the four dissenting Justices, only Justices Scalia and Thomas discussed standing, each joining 
the other’s opinion arguing that the Arizona legislature did not have standing. Id. at 2694–97 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); id. at 2697–99 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Alito’s 
positions on the Arizona legislature’s standing, therefore, are unclear. Justice Scalia advanced his 
familiar position that federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III “[does] not include suits between 
units of government regarding their legitimate powers.” Id. at 2694–95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice 
Thomas commented on the Court’s “tradition of disdain for state ballot initiatives,” noting its 
inconsistency with the Court’s holding on the merits, but concluded by explaining he would decide the 
case by finding the Arizona legislature lacked standing. Id. at 2697, 2699 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 2663–66 (majority opinion). 
94 Id. at 2663–64. Thus, the Court seemingly rejected the requirement that the Arizona legislature 
take a “specific legislative act” to obtain standing. 
95 Id. at 2664. The Court further distinguished Raines on the basis that the Arizona legislature’s 
claim “does not touch or concern the question whether Congress has standing to bring a suit against the 
President. There is no federal analogue to Arizona’s initiative power, and a suit between Congress and 
the President would raise separation-of-powers concerns absent here.” Id. at 2665 n.12. Responding to 
Justice Scalia’s concern that the Framers would have been “all the more averse to unprecedented 
judicial meddling by federal courts with the branches of their state governments,” id. at 2697 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), the majority noted that the party invoking jurisdiction was in fact a state government. Id. at 
2666 n.14 (majority opinion). 
96 Id. at 2665 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823–24 (1997)). Justice Scalia took issue with 
the majority’s reliance on Raines, remarking that “Coleman was a peculiar case that may well stand for 
nothing” and downplaying the decision’s precedential force. Id. at 2696–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Arizona legislature on the merits,97 the Court nevertheless found the 
legislature had standing to bring the suit forward. 
The final decisions of import for legislator standing are the Tenth 
Circuit’s rulings in Kerr v. Hickenlooper,98 which provide the most in-
depth discussion of the legislator standing doctrine among recent cases. In 
Kerr, current and former Colorado state legislators challenged the 
constitutionality of Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR), a voter-
enacted amendment to the state constitution.99 They argued TABOR 
violates the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution100 and raised 
additional challenges.101 After a district court certified the legislators’ 
standing to bring suit,102 a Tenth Circuit panel affirmed,103 with Judge 
Lucero writing for the panel. Following this initial decision, the Supreme 
Court vacated and remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit for 
reconsideration in light of the Court’s decision in Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission.104 On remand, the Tenth Circuit reversed its 
position, holding the legislators did not have standing.105  
To demonstrate an injury in fact, the Kerr legislators asserted that 
TABOR precludes them from performing “legislative core functions of 
taxation and appropriation.”106 Endeavoring to situate the legislators’ injury 
in the context of Coleman and Raines, Judge Lucero initially considered 
the legislators’ injury neither a nullification of an actual, otherwise 
effective vote nor a mere abstract dilution of institutional legislative 
power.107 Ultimately, he concluded that the legislators’ injury was “closer” 
to that involved in Coleman and emphasized that TABOR rendered the 
legislators’ votes on tax issues advisory in nature, referencing Coleman’s 
97 Id. at 2677 (majority opinion). 
98 Kerr I, 744 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (mem.). 
99 COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20. TABOR is a complex provision, but for the purposes of this inquiry, 
it is sufficient to note that TABOR precludes the Colorado state legislature from voting to enact tax 
increases, or tax policy changes that result in a net increase in taxation above a certain threshold, 
without submitting the desired increase to a popular vote. Id. § 20, cl. 4(a). 
100 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
101 Kerr I, 744 F.3d at 1161. The Kerr plaintiffs argued that TABOR directly contravenes the 
Colorado Enabling Act, ch. 139, § 4, 18 Stat. 474, 474 (1875), under which Colorado was admitted as a 
state in 1876, and that TABOR impermissibly amends the Colorado Constitution. 
102 Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1118, 1139 (D. Colo. 2012). 
103 Kerr I, 744 F.3d at 1172. 
104 Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (mem.). 
105 Kerr II, No. 12-1445, 2016 WL 3126203, at *1 (10th Cir. June 3, 2016). 
106 Kerr I, 744 F.3d at 1163; see also Response to Governor’s Opening Brief at 41, Kerr I, 744 F.3d 
1156 (10th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-1445), 2013 WL 1721392, at *41 (“What has been ‘lost’ in the instant 
case is not a vote, but any ability to carry out the fundamental responsibility of a legislature to raise 
revenue needed to meet the needs of the state.”). 
107 Kerr I, 744 F.3d at 1165–66. 
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effectiveness standard.108 Thus, Judge Lucero eschewed the notion that the 
legislators should have to identify a “specific legislative act”—in this case, 
a referred tax increase109—for which their votes had been nullified.110 
Rather, the nature of the legislators’ injury was “disempowerment rather 
than the failure of any specific tax increase.”111 Judge Lucero further opined 
that “it would be a bizarre result if the nullification of a single vote 
supported legislative standing, but the nullification of a legislator’s 
authority to cast a large number of votes did not.”112 
Judge Lucero relied upon two additional considerations in 
distinguishing the legislators’ injury from that in Raines. First, he observed 
that because TABOR cannot be repealed by the Colorado legislature, the 
legislators were without recourse for their alleged injuries by way of the 
ordinary legislative process.113 The Kerr legislators had not lost a vote for 
which they were seeking relief in the courts as in Raines; rather, the 
legislators “allege[d] that TABOR has stripped the legislature of its rightful 
power.”114 Second, he noted that the plaintiffs’ identity as state, as opposed 
to federal, legislators mitigated the separation of powers concerns that 
animated the decision in Raines.115 He added that while the Colorado 
General Assembly had not formally endorsed or authorized the legislators 
to bring suit, the General Assembly submitted an amicus curiae brief 
supporting the legislators’ standing,116 again distinguishing Raines, in 
which both houses of Congress opposed the legislators’ suit.117 
Following the panel’s decision, the defendants moved for rehearing en 
banc, which the Tenth Circuit voted to deny.118 Four judges dissented from 
the denial, one of whom, Judge Tymkovich, wrote a dissenting opinion 
disputing the panel’s recognition of the legislators’ standing. Judge 
Tymkovich hypothesized that authorizing standing in this circumstance 
would permit legislators to bring suit to vindicate legislative core functions 
108 Id. at 1165–67. 
109 Under TABOR, the Colorado state legislature can “refer” tax increases for popular vote, but 
cannot enact them unilaterally. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20, cl. 3(b). 
110 Kerr I, 744 F.3d at 1168. 
111 Id. at 1169. 
112 Id. at 1170. 
113 Id. at 1166. 
114 Id. at 1167. 
115 Id. at 1168. 
116 Id. at 1168 & n.7. 
117 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997). Finding that the legislator plaintiffs had standing to 
sue, Judge Lucero proceeded to explain why the political question doctrine should not bar their claims. 
Kerr I, 744 F.3d at 1172–81. 
118 Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 759 F.3d 1186, 1186 (10th Cir. 2014). 
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potentially obstructed by other state constitutional amendments.119 He also 
countered the legislators’ notion of what constitutes an “effective” vote 
under Coleman, contending that “effectiveness” in this context could be 
achieved by the legislators voting to refer a tax measure to Colorado’s 
electorate, even if the measure was not ultimately adopted.120 Ultimately, 
Judge Tymkovich argued for a strict interpretation of Raines, under which 
“legislative standing is limited to claims of nullifications of specific, 
otherwise valid votes,” concluding that the Kerr legislators had not suffered 
an injury of this type.121 
On remand, Judge Lucero centered on what the panel construed to be 
the core holding in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission: that 
“individual legislators,” like those in Kerr, “lack standing because they 
assert only an institutional injury.”122 Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, Judge Lucero concluded, “materially alter[ed] the 
jurisprudence on legislator standing.”123 It established a “threshold 
question” of whether individual legislators assert individual or institutional 
injury.124 In the latter instance, Judge Lucero interpreted Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission to preclude standing. He proceeded, 
however, to acknowledge that this analytical approach was “difficult to 
square” with Coleman and Raines, the latter of which he described as 
“internally inconsistent.”125 He further conceded that “Arizona did not 
expressly hold that only an institutional plaintiff possesses standing to 
assert an institutional injury,” inviting the Court to “clarify the matter on 
further review.”126 Still, notwithstanding its recognition that Kerr “parallels 
[Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission] in many respects,”127 the 
panel denied the legislators’ standing.  
119 See id. at 1188–89 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (arguing, for example, that based on the panel 
decision, legislators could bring suit to strike down Colorado’s constitutional amendment legalizing 
recreational marijuana, COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, on the basis that the provision deprives the 
legislature of its legislative core function of “codifying the criminal law”). 
120 Kerr, 759 F.3d at 1190–91. 
121 Id. at 1191. 
122 Kerr II, No. 12-1445, 2016 WL 3126203, at *1 (10th Cir. June 3, 2016). Note that this focus 
departs from, and does not address, the issues presented by the dissenters from the prior denial of 
hearing en banc.  
123 Id. 
124 Id. at *4. 
125 Id. at *4. 
126 Id. at *5. 
127 Id. at *3. 
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II. LEGISLATOR STANDING AT PRESENT: SYNTHESIS AND SHORTCOMINGS
This Part begins by synthesizing the current approach to legislator
standing. The current approach consists first of determining whether 
legislators’ injuries constitute nullified votes or abstract dilutions of 
institutional legislative power, and then considering a number of additional, 
prudential factors. Nullified votes, when buttressed by an absence of 
prudential factors that would otherwise counsel against justiciability, 
warrant standing. 
This Part then critiques the current approach in two stages, first by 
discussing shortcomings of the vote nullification–abstract dilution of 
legislative power paradigm and exploring the paradigm’s 
underinclusiveness. This Part then argues that additional factors in the 
legislator standing analysis are prudential in nature and have therefore been 
preempted by the Court’s decision in Lexmark, or are in any event ill-
founded considerations that should play no role in legislator standing 
analysis. 
A. The Current Approach to Legislator Standing
1. Vote Nullification or Abstract Dilution of Institutional Legislative
Power?—As discussed in more detail in Part I, the dominant
approach of courts that have considered the standing of legislators post-
Raines has been to consider whether legislators’ asserted injuries rise to 
“the level of vote nullification at issue in Coleman [or] the abstract dilution 
of institutional legislative power” alleged in Raines.128 If an alleged injury 
amounts to no more than an abstract dilution of institutional legislative 
power, courts have refused to recognize legislators’ standing.129 
Alternatively, where legislators can demonstrate their votes have been 
nullified, courts have permitted legislators’ claims to proceed.130 
What constitutes “nullification,” however, is less than clear.131 It 
appears settled that “an official’s mere disobedience or flawed execution of 
128 Raines, 521 U.S. at 826. The Court’s recent decision in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission indicates that vote nullification remains the operative standard. 
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 (2015) (describing the Arizona legislature’s injury as nullification of any present 
or future vote). Thus, contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s decision on remand in Kerr, Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission did not “materially alter” legislator standing jurisprudence by eliminating 
standing where individual legislators sue on institutional injuries. Kerr II, 2016 WL 3126203, at *6. If 
anything, the Court’s decision implicitly expanded legislator standing by also recognizing that the 
Arizona legislature had lost an opportunity to vote. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
129 See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23–24 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
130 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2713–14 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
131 “It is, to be sure, not readily apparent what the Supreme Court meant by [nullified.]” Campbell, 
203 F.3d at 22. 
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a law for which a legislator voted . . . is not an injury in fact for standing 
purposes.”132 It remains unsettled, however, whether deprivation of an 
opportunity to vote,133 as opposed to cancellation of a recorded vote, 
constitutes nullification.134 To that end, there is some suggestion that 
legislators might suffer certain cognizable injuries that cannot be construed 
as vote nullification, at least where there is loss of a voting opportunity or 
perceived voting right.135 
2. Additional Factors.—Courts have then proceeded to consider at
least four additional factors that inform the legislator standing inquiry, 
many of which originated in Raines. The first is a notion of the separation 
of powers that seems to hold that the province of the judiciary should not 
extend to deciding disputes between the Executive and Legislative 
branches.136 The Court in Raines relied upon a historical practice of judicial 
abstention from disputes between the Executive and Legislature,137 and 
subsequent decisions of federal courts denying standing for legislators have 
continued to rely upon separation of powers concerns.138 
132 Russell v. DeJongh, 491 F.3d 130, 134 (3d Cir. 2007). 
133 Deprivation of an opportunity to vote consists of complete denial of a perceived voting right, 
such that a vote is never recorded. For example, in Kerr v. Hickenlooper, the legislator plaintiffs’ injury 
was not cancellation of a recorded vote, but deprivation of an opportunity to vote on tax measures at all. 
See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
134 Compare Russell, 491 F.3d at 135 (“[D]epriving a legislator of an opportunity to vote . . . is an 
injury in fact.”), with Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding deprivation of 
Congressmen’s “right[] to participate and vote on legislation in a manner defined by the Constitution” 
did not satisfy Article III’s injury in fact requirement (alteration in original) (quoting Moore v. U.S. 
House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). 
135 Kerr I, 744 F.3d 1156, 1170 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e do not read Raines to require legislators 
seeking standing to plead facts” demonstrating nullification of a specific vote.), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 
2927 (2015) (mem.); see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 
2652, 2663, 2665 (2015) (characterizing the Arizona legislature’s alleged injury as loss of “the 
opportunity to engage (or decline to engage) in redistricting,” and then rejecting any requirement that 
the legislature have undertaken (or attempted to undertake) any specific legislative act). 
136 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997) (“[O]ur standing inquiry has been especially 
rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by 
one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.”); see also id. at 832–33 
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Because it is fairly debatable whether appellees’ injury is 
sufficiently personal and concrete to give them standing, it behooves us to resolve the question under 
more general separation-of-powers principles underlying our standing requirements.”). 
137 Id. at 826–29 (majority opinion) (concluding that “[i]t is evident from several episodes in our 
history that in analogous confrontations between one or both Houses of Congress and the Executive 
Branch, no suit was brought on the basis of claimed injury to official authority or power,” and 
considering various historical disputes between the Executive and Legislative branches not resolved by 
the judiciary as evidence that such suits are not justiciable).  
138 See, e.g., Russell, 491 F.3d at 133 (“Concerns for separation of powers and the limited role of 
the judiciary . . . are particularly acute in legislator standing cases . . . .” (citation omitted)); Chenoweth, 
181 F.3d at 116 (interpreting Raines to require the court to “merge [its] separation of powers and 
standing analyses”); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2704–05 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “confrontation” between Congress and the President outside of a courtroom, 
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A second, oft-cited factor is whether ordinary legislative means 
remain available to legislators seeking judicial recourse.139 This factor 
relates to the separation of powers concerns discussed in the previous 
paragraph in that, if legislative means remain available, it is not the proper 
place of the judiciary to involve itself.140 The nature and type of legislative 
means sufficient to satisfy this factor are somewhat unclear. The decision 
in Raines seems to envision the hypothetical possibility of repealing, 
enacting, or defunding offending legislation as sufficient.141 Decisions 
interpreting Raines, however, have offered varying interpretations of 
adequate legislative means.142 
A corollary of the requirement of exhaustion of legislative means is a 
third factor: that legislator plaintiffs have the support of the institution in 
which they serve, reflecting the notion that the alleged injury stems from 
their membership in a legislative body.143 The content of this factor, as 
opposed to the others discussed in this Section, appears settled: legislator 
rather than a lawsuit, is the proper means of resolving interbranch disputes); cf. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2665 n.12 (“There is no federal analogue to Arizona’s initiative 
power, and a suit between Congress and the President would raise separation-of-powers concerns 
absent here.”); Kerr I, 744 F.3d at 1168 (“[B]ecause the present suit deals with the relationship between 
a state legislature and its citizenry, we are not presented with the separation-of-powers concerns that 
were present in Raines.”). 
139 Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (“We also note that our conclusion [denying standing] neither deprives 
Members of Congress of an adequate remedy (since they may repeal the [challenged] Act or exempt 
appropriations bills from its reach).”); see also Russell, 491 F.3d at 135–36 (refusing to recognize the 
standing of a legislator in part on the basis that effective remedies remained in the political process); cf. 
Kerr I, 744 F.3d at 1169 (distinguishing the “extent and type of disempowerment” of the legislator 
plaintiffs from instances in which legislative remedies remained available). 
140 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If majorities in both Houses of 
Congress care enough about the matter, they have available innumerable ways to compel executive 
action without a lawsuit . . . . But the condition is crucial; Congress must care enough to act against the 
President itself, not merely enough to instruct its lawyers to ask us to do so.”). 
141 Raines, 521 U.S. at 829. 
142 Compare Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding the legislator plaintiffs 
retained “ample legislative power” to remedy their alleged wrongs, despite the legislators having failed 
in their attempts to pass a concurrent resolution against and oppose appropriations for challenged 
Executive action), with Kerr I, 744 F.3d at 1168 (finding the legislator plaintiffs lacked the “ability to 
correct [their] alleged injury through ordinary legislation,” notwithstanding any particular assertion of a 
frustrated effort on the part of the legislators). See also Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 
2664 (holding that “[t]o establish standing, the Legislature need not violate the Arizona Constitution 
and show that the Secretary of State would similarly disregard the State’s fundamental instrument of 
government”). 
143 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Raines for the proposition that 
“lack of institutional endorsement [is] a sign of [a] standing problem” for legislators bringing suit in 
their institutional capacities); see also Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2664 
(commenting favorably that the Arizona legislature “commenced this action after authorizing votes in 
both of its chambers”); Kerr II, No. 12-1445, 2016 WL 3126203, at *4–6 (10th Cir. June 3, 2016). 
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plaintiffs must have, at minimum, the support of the majority of the 
chamber in which they serve as a legislator.144 
Finally, courts have considered whether a private citizen, as opposed 
to a legislator, could bring suit to remedy the alleged wrong. The Court in 
Raines explicitly relied on this possibility,145 and shortly after the decision 
was issued, a private citizen successfully brought suit.146 The purpose 
behind this factor appears to be twofold: first, to help guard against 
entertaining suits asserting generalized grievances,147 and second, to ensure 
the judiciary’s proper respect for the separation of powers.148 
B. Critique of the Current Approach to Legislator Standing
1. Problems with the Vote Nullification–Abstract Dilution of
Institutional Legislative Power Paradigm.—Federal courts have
struggled in applying the Court’s vote nullification–abstract dilution of 
institutional legislative power paradigm.149 The Court has taken note of this 
struggle,150 and its decisions suggest the present Court might prefer a 
different standard.151 This dissatisfaction reflects two particular problems 
144 For example, in Windsor, the House of Representatives authorized the BLAG to defend the 
constitutionality of DOMA. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; see also Kerr II, 2016 WL 
3126203, at *5 (discussing lack of institutional endorsement in the Colorado General Assembly as 
militating against standing); cf. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (“We attach some importance to the fact that 
[the legislator plaintiffs] have not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in 
this action, and indeed both Houses actively oppose their suit.”). 
145 Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (“We also note that our conclusion [does not] . . . foreclose[] the Act 
from constitutional challenge (by someone who suffers judicially cognizable injury as a result of the 
Act).”). 
146 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
147 See Russell v. DeJongh, 491 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A] legislator’s interest in seeing 
that the law is followed is no different from a private citizen’s general interest in proper government.”). 
148 Raines, 521 U.S. at 833 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (reasoning that entertaining a 
suit by a private citizen, as opposed to hearing an “interbranch controversy about calibrating the 
legislative and executive powers, as well as an intrabranch dispute between segments of Congress . . . 
would expose the Judicial Branch to a lesser risk”).  
149 See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text. 
150 In the Windsor decision, Justice Scalia incisively captured the frustrating nature of the vote 
nullification standard in a footnote: “A principled and predictable system of jurisprudence cannot rest 
upon a shifting concept of injury, designed to support standing when we would like it.” 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2704 n.3 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
151 Based on his opinion in Windsor, see discussion supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text, 
Justice Alito seems to envision broader standing for legislators. That he did not join dissents discussing 
standing in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, see supra note 92, lends some support to 
that understanding. Chief Justice Roberts, despite objecting to standing in Windsor, did not specifically 
dissent on standing in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, while the opposite is true of 
Justice Thomas (who did not dissent on standing in Windsor, but dissented in Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission). Justice Scalia, of course, adamantly opposed standing for legislators, but 
was no supporter of the vote nullification standard either. See supra note 150. And as for the rest of the 
present Court, the majority’s decision in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission affirmed the 
continuing vitality of vote nullification, but envisioned the concept somewhat more broadly. 135 S. Ct. 
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that have arisen from grounding the legislator standing doctrine in vote 
nullification. First, the Court’s use of vote nullification in Raines was 
meant to cabin Coleman’s potentially expansive vote-effectiveness 
language in the particular circumstance of Raines.152 Courts have then tried 
to apply vote nullification in other contexts, however, for which the 
standard is ill suited. Second, vote nullification helps understand some 
aspects of the legislative function, but does not account for every injury a 
legislator might have. Thus, vote nullification will not capture some 
injuries that should be cognizable under Article III. 
As discussed in Part I, the decision in Raines arose to respond to 
language in Coleman that might have given rise to legislators, specifically 
members of Congress, making expansive use of judicial fora in resolving 
disputes with the Executive.153 It is not surprising that this possibility 
influenced the Court to recognize only very isolated circumstances in 
which legislators might have standing to sue for failed execution or 
implementation of the law.154 Raines might have come out differently, 
however, if the named defendant and the manifestation of injury, or both, 
changed. The Court might have treated the legislators’ standing very 
differently if the case involved not interbranch conflict, but members of 
Congress suing a different entity.155 Additionally, the Court might have 
2652, 2664–65 (2015) (characterizing the Arizona legislature’s injury as both a lost opportunity to vote 
and vote nullification). This seems to follow logically from Justices Breyer’s and Ginsburg’s statements 
in prior cases. In his dissent in Raines, Justice Breyer envisioned broader standing for legislators 
bringing suit in their institutional capacities based on foundational adverseness, rather than vote 
nullification. 521 U.S. at 839 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I concede that there would be no case or 
controversy here were the dispute before us not truly adversary, or were it not concrete and focused. But 
the interests that the parties assert are genuine and opposing, and the parties are therefore truly 
adverse.”). Justice Ginsburg joined a concurrence in Raines that agreed that standing should be denied 
largely on separation of powers grounds, rather than holding that the legislators did not demonstrate a 
sufficient injury in fact. See id. at 832–33 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). This point was also 
central to the majority opinion she authored in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. 135 S. 
Ct. at 2665 n.12. 
152 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 825–26 (appraising the legislator plaintiff’s desired definition of 
Coleman’s concept of an “effective” vote as a “drastic extension” the Court was “unwilling to take”). 
153 Note, Standing in the Way of Separation of Powers: The Consequences of Raines v. Byrd, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 1741, 1750 (1999) (“A close examination of the Raines opinion reveals that the 
majority was making a[n] . . . argument against ‘a system of judicial refereeship’ in denying 
congressional standing. . . . [The] Court made various statements hinting that political disputes within 
the legislature should be resolved through the legislative process—not through litigation.”); see also 
Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court: The Past, Present, and 
Future of Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 281 (2001) (commenting on the 
propensity for legislators to bring suit in court, particularly that “legislators will be inclined to use the 
courts as a political venue to challenge the President or other Executive Branch officials”). 
154 See Note, supra note 153, at 1752–53 (identifying “concerns about the dangers of judicial self-
aggrandizement from interfering with the political process by umpiring intrabranch and interbranch 
disputes” as motivating Raines’s vote nullification standard). 
155 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 828–29 (describing the “restricted role for Article III courts” as “not 
some amorphous general supervision of the operations of government” (quoting United States v. 
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been more willing to entertain a suit alleging abridgement of some other 
enumerated power, as opposed to dilution of an already exercised power.156 
Predictably, therefore, lower federal courts have struggled to apply Raines 
when legislators have named non-Executive defendants and sought relief 
for different types of injuries.157 
To that end, if Raines is understood to equate the only possible 
cognizable injury to legislators in their institutional capacities with vote 
nullification, Raines misunderstands the nature of the legislative function.158 
As just one example of this misunderstanding, legislators can suffer 
reputational or electoral injuries when they lose an opportunity to vote—
even where a vote would fail to produce official action—because voters 
respond to individual votes at the ballot box, even where votes result in no 
official action.159 Legislators frequently introduce and vote for “statement” 
legislation as a way of appealing to their base electorate, even where the 
legislation has no chance of passing.160 Additionally, focusing narrowly on 
voting ignores the value of open debate and the free exchange of ideas that 
precede and inform voting in our democratic process.161 It is not difficult to 
imagine hypothetical situations in which the majority party of a legislative 
chamber imposes discriminatory obstacles on members of a minority 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974))); see also Note, supra note 153, at 1751 (explaining the Raines 
decision as evincing hesitation on the part of the Court to “serve as an umpire of political disputes 
between the other two branches” (emphasis added)). Additionally, as the Court stated in Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission, suits concerning the proper role of state government do not 
present the same concerns. Supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
156 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 829–30 (summarizing the context of the legislators’ suit and observing 
that “[w]hether the case would be different if any of these circumstances were different we need not 
now decide”); see also Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 153, at 260 (emphasizing the “narrowness” of the 
holding in Raines, and discussing instances in which legislators might have standing). 
157 See, e.g., supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text. 
158 See Note, supra note 153, at 1757 (describing “the implication that nullification of a vote would 
be judicially cognizable but nullification of a right to vote would not be” a “deep[] problem”). 
159 Cf. R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL’Y 371, 375 (1986) 
(“[Legislators] may vote in favor of legislation about which they have substantial doubts because it 
would be difficult to explain a contrary vote to their constituents.”). To the extent one might view such 
injuries as “just part of politics,” Article III provides no indication why a politically significant injury 
creates any less of a case or controversy than an injury in another context. 
160 For artistic commentary on a well-known contemporary example, see Mike Smith, Attempts to 
Repeal Obamacare Continue, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2015, 8:46 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mikesmith/attempts-to-repeal-obamace_b_6648616.html 
[http://perma.cc/957Y-WW5R]. 
161 See U.S CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except 
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the 
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or 
Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.”). 
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party’s efforts to introduce, debate, or vote on legislation.162 Such actions 
should be understood to injure these legislators in their institutional 
capacities—“zero[ing] in on any individual member”163—despite not 
involving nullification of a recorded vote. 
Given this context, the Court’s decision in Raines cannot—or at least 
should not—be read to address every instance in which legislators might 
seek standing to bring suit in federal court in their institutional capacities.164 
An improved framework for evaluating legislator standing, therefore, 
would abandon the requirement that federal courts shoehorn variant 
legislative injuries into one of two categories—vote nullification or not—
that are incapable of encompassing the likely scope of those injuries. 
2. Problems with Additional Factors in the Legislator Standing
Analysis.—As outlined in Part II.A.2, in addition to considering if
legislators’ posited injuries amount to vote nullification, courts have 
evaluated a number of additional factors that might influence whether to 
recognize standing. Despite a significant lack of clarity in how exactly 
these factors should influence the legislator standing analysis, the factors 
are most akin to prudential considerations that might counsel for or against 
recognizing standing, whether a cognizable injury in fact exists or not.165 To 
that end, following the Court’s recent decision in Lexmark, these factors 
should be abandoned unless they can be recategorized as finding their basis 
in Article III, which they cannot. Even if the factors are not wholly 
prudential, and therefore unaffected by Lexmark, they are nevertheless ill-
founded considerations. 
As discussed in Part I.A.2, prudential standing has historically 
consisted of a set of judicially created norms that supplement the standing 
requirements of Article III. The Court’s treatment of additional factors in 
the legislator standing analysis as supplementary to an initial consideration 
of whether the legislators’ alleged injuries amount to vote nullification 
162 As unlikely as these circumstances may seem, the Raines majority itself was aware of such 
situations and seemed to imply that allegations of “discriminatory” actions might constitute an injury in 
fact. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 824 n.7 (1997). 
163 Kerr II, No. 12-1445, 2016 WL 3126203, at *4 (10th Cir. June 3, 2016) (citing Arizona State 
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2015)). The 
Tenth Circuit on remand in Kerr seemed to recognize this point, but summarily rebuffed the legislators’ 
claims based on an insufficiently nuanced reading of Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. 
Supra note 128 and accompanying text.  
164 See Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 153, at 255 (“[R]ather than develop a detailed doctrine of 
legislator standing . . . the Court [in Raines] decided the case on exceptionally narrow grounds and left 
many questions unanswered.”). 
165 These factors are best considered prudential because they are judicially created and are not, as 
discussed in this Section, consistent with traditional Article III standing analysis. 
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suggests, therefore, that the additional factors are prudential in nature.166 
For the most part, lower federal courts interpreting Raines have treated 
these additional factors in a prudential manner.167 Thus, the Court’s recent 
Lexmark decision seems to counsel that these factors, unless they can be 
reclassified as finding their basis in Article III, should be abandoned.168 
Because these factors are inconsistent with a traditional, Article III standing 
analysis, and are in any case ill founded, they should not influence the 
legislator standing doctrine. 
As for the first factor—whether separation of powers concerns counsel 
against recognizing legislators’ standing—it is unclear why an additional 
separation of powers inquiry should follow satisfaction of Article III 
standing requirements, which are of themselves meant to ensure proper 
cabining of the judicial role.169 If additional concerns about the capacity of 
the judiciary to resolve a particular dispute remain, these would seem best 
resolved by recourse to mootness or the political question doctrine,170 if at 
all.171 And, as an ancillary matter, the separation of powers concerns that 
166 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 829–30 (finding that, in addition to the legislator plaintiffs failing to 
allege their votes had been nullified, the legislators did not have the approval of the House, they 
retained adequate legislative remedies, and a private citizen could bring suit instead). 
167 See, e.g., Kerr I, 744 F.3d 1156, 1167–69 (10th Cir. 2014) (observing, only after addressing 
Raines’s vote nullification standard, that the legislator plaintiffs’ claims did not raise compromising 
separation of powers concerns, legislative remedies were unavailable, and the plaintiffs’ legislative 
chamber had intervened in their favor), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (mem.). 
168 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
169 See supra note 27 and accompanying text; Weiner, supra note 3, at 230 (“Though separation of 
powers proponents typically counsel against premature transfer of disputes from the political branches 
to the judiciary, the ban on advisory opinions and the ripeness doctrine already account for these 
concerns.”). Additionally, as commentators have noted, the great irony in denying standing to 
legislators on separation of powers grounds is that legislators often bring suit to vindicate the separation 
of powers. Note, supra note 153, at 1758 (“Although Raines v. Byrd is best understood as a decision 
seeking to preserve separation of powers by restricting congressional standing, the Court failed to 
acknowledge that such special restrictions might result in inadequate enforcement of the principle of 
separation of powers.”). 
170 See Blank, supra note 2, at 623 (“[T]he Court has employed standing as a convenient method to 
dismiss politically-oriented cases it does not want to decide on the merits. This result is analytically 
curious because the Court has more appropriate means by which it could dismiss the suit . . . .”). Blank 
suggests courts might utilize the ripeness doctrine, id., but the political question doctrine seems an 
equally apt choice. 
171 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 58, at 1059–60 (“[W]e must abandon the political question 
doctrine, in all of its manifestations. The doctrine inherently implies that one or both of the political 
branches may continue conduct that could conceivably be found unconstitutional, without any 
examination or supervision by the judicial branch. The moral cost of such a result, both to society in 
general and to the Supreme Court in particular, far outweighs whatever benefits are thought to derive 
from the judicial abdication of the review function.”). 
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might militate against denying standing to resolve an interbranch conflict 
may not apply when legislators bring suit in a different context.172 
The second factor asks whether ordinary legislative means remain 
available to legislators seeking judicial recourse. This concern seems 
directly at odds with traditional standing considerations where private 
citizens are involved and there is no such “exhaustion” requirement.173 
Additionally, in the legislator standing context, exhaustion of legislative 
remedies will often be impossible, as legislator plaintiffs that are members 
of a minority party do not have any reasonable chance of persuading 
enough of their colleagues to take legislative action.174 Article III does not 
incorporate the will of the political majority as defining injury in fact, but 
entrusts the judiciary with performing a countermajoritarian function.175 
To that end, the third factor, gaining support of a majority of the 
legislative chamber concerned, will not be feasible for most if not all 
legislator plaintiffs of a minority party.176 From an Article III perspective, 
there is no reason why this support is necessary. Individual members of 
associational bodies do not have to receive permission from the institution, 
or support from a majority of its members, in order to bring a cognizable 
suit under Article III.177 In fact, the Court’s associational standing 
jurisprudence functions in the opposite manner: institutions have standing 
only insofar as individual members are injured.178 
Finally, it should make no difference whether, under the fourth factor, 
a private citizen might bring suit. Article III is agnostic as to whether there 
is a different, hypothetical plaintiff who might bring a “better” lawsuit, as 
172 See, e.g., Kerr I, 744 F.3d at 1168 (distinguishing Raines on the basis that the legislator 
plaintiffs’ claims raised questions about “the relationship between a state legislature and its citizenry,” 
as opposed to Congress and the President). 
173 See Blank, supra note 2, at 618 (observing that private citizens are not required to exhaust non-
judicial remedies in order to demonstrate an Article III injury in fact). 
174 See Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 181 F.3d 1333, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (observing that 
“there [was] not the slightest suggestion” that the seventeen legislator plaintiffs “had the votes” to take 
legislative action); see also Note, supra note 153, at 1754 (“[T]he Court’s requirement that the plaintiffs 
either have authorization of either House or form a voting bloc sufficient to enact or defeat a measure 
implies that those who would have access to the courts do not need it, whereas those who need access 
would not have it.”). 
175 See Scalia, supra note 27, at 894. An implication of this point is that, if a majority of a 
legislative body injures the minority, the judiciary should not abdicate its role by deferring to the 
majority on whether minority members are injured. 
176 See Babbitt, 181 F.3d at 1338. 
177 See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (requiring, for the 
purposes of associational standing, that an association show “the interests it seeks to protect are 
germane to the organization’s purpose,” but imposing no requirement of majority support by the 
organization). 
178 Id. at 342–43 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). 
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long as the party before the Court can show the requisite injury in fact.179 
Even if the Court was concerned about the standing of hypothetical 
plaintiffs relative to one another, legislators will in some cases possess a 
superior litigation position where institutional injuries—injuries to their 
legislative capacities—are involved.180 Additionally, as the Court has 
recognized, waiting for a private citizen to bring suit might permit 
constitutional violations to continue unabated.181 And finally, if a private 
citizen were to bring suit, Article III’s bar on generalized grievances might 
apply.182 
For the foregoing reasons, prudential considerations that have 
significantly influenced the standing analysis should no longer dictate 
courts’ analyses of legislator standing. Removing consideration of these 
factors laudably redirects the inquiry to Article III—specifically, what 
constitutes an adequate legislative injury—and other justiciability concerns. 
III. REFORMULATION OF THE LEGISLATOR STANDING DOCTRINE
This final Part proposes a reformulation of the legislator standing
doctrine. It starts from the following premises, as discussed in Part II: first, 
limiting legislators’ cognizable injuries in fact to nullifications of recorded 
votes misreads Raines and misunderstands the legislative function; and 
second, prudential considerations that have traditionally informed the 
courts’ consideration of legislator standing should so inform no longer. 
This Part then proceeds to consider alternatives for defining a legislative 
injury in fact under Article III. It concludes that it should suffice for Article 
III purposes that a legislator can identify the abridgement of a 
constitutionally or statutorily enumerated legislative power. This should 
include certain instances of depriving legislators of an opportunity to vote. 
179 This injury need be concrete in order to be adequate, but need not be superior to another’s 
interest. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text; see generally Richard M. Re, Relative 
Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191 (2014) (recognizing a pattern of the Supreme Court performing “a 
relative assessment of superiority” in cases involving nontraditional plaintiffs, despite standing 
doctrine’s traditional concern solely with the adequacy of injury). 
180 Re, supra note 179, at 1234–35 (arguing that where “nontraditional plaintiffs,” as in legislators, 
bring suit, federal courts should recognize standing under Article III in instances where legislators have 
a “superior interest,” or “greatest stake,” in the suit, and discussing injuries manifested by legislative 
procedure as an example). 
181 See Weiner, supra note 3, at 231–32 (using Raines as an example of an instance in which a 
judicially prescribed waiting period for a citizen plaintiff to bring suit can require the Executive and 
Legislative Branches to presume the constitutionality of an act that is in fact unconstitutional, resulting 
in a greater volume of unconstitutional action than if the Court had recognized the standing of 
legislators and reached the merits in their suit). 
182 If an alleged injury to the institutional capacity of a legislature has no substantive impact on 
individual citizens, any one citizen represented by the legislature would have an interest 
undifferentiated from his or her fellow citizens. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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Recognizing that this definitional change will expand the number of 
instances in which legislators have suffered a cognizable injury in fact, this 
Part concludes by discussing how other aspects of justiciability, including 
ripeness and the political question doctrine, can cabin legislators’ 
potentially litigious desires and assuage the separation of powers concerns 
that have long undergirded the legislator standing doctrine. 
In a world without precedent, federal courts could use a number of 
definitional standards to determine what constitutes a cognizable legislative 
injury. Vote nullification, which this Note has explored in detail, is one of 
the narrowest possibilities.183 Denying legislator standing completely is 
probably the only narrower option, but has not been and should not be the 
doctrinal approach moving forward.184 
On the other hand, there are a number of options broader than 
nullification. One, as the plaintiffs in Kerr presented, is to grant standing to 
legislators whenever they assert an injury to a “legislative core function.”185 
This option has some intuitive appeal, as the Supreme Court has resorted to 
the definition of “legislative” in the context of other doctrines.186 At least in 
the case of Kerr, however, the definition of injury assumes what it seeks to 
prove, in that the suit seeks to vindicate alleged rights of republican 
governance.187 Additionally, permitting legislators to sue any time they feel 
as if some action violated a core legislative function would likely lead to an 
183 See Blank, supra note 2, at 624 (commenting that after Raines, “[i]n all likelihood, the 
courthouse door has finally slammed shut” to legislators suing in their institutional capacities). 
184 Denying legislator standing entirely is not without its advocates. Chief among them are Justice 
Scalia and former Judge Robert Bork. Their positions reflect concern that the Framers never envisioned 
the judiciary resolving disputes between the Executive and Legislative Branches. See, e.g., United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2704 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ‘enormous power that 
the judiciary would acquire’ from the ability to adjudicate such suits ‘would have made a mockery of 
[Hamilton’s] quotation of Montesquieu to the effect that “of the three powers above mentioned . . . the 
JUDICIARY is next to nothing.”’” (alterations in original) (quoting Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 58 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting))). This position fails to account for legislator suits that do not 
name the Executive as defendant and do not concern mere dissatisfaction with execution of the laws. It 
also fails to consider negative ramifications for the separation of powers that might result from denying 
standing in such suits. 
185 Supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
186 Formalist approaches to the separation of powers depend upon the definition of “legislative” to 
properly demarcate the proper ambit of the Branch’s powers. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. 
Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers 
Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 474 (1991) (advocating for “pragmatic formalism” in understanding the 
separation of powers, which requires “a pragmatically-based definitional analysis of the concepts of 
‘executive,’ ‘legislative,’ and ‘judicial’ power”); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) 
(defining acts “legislative in purpose” as those that have “the purpose and effect of altering the legal 
rights, duties, and relations of persons”). 
187 The Kerr plaintiffs argued that TABOR violates the Guarantee Clause by depriving the state of 
a republican form of government, supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text, and thus whether 
republicanism is at the core of the legislative function is entirely what their suit asked the courts to 
determine.  
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unwanted volume of legislative lawsuits that would, by their very nature, 
require courts to embroil themselves in the types of undesirable matters the 
Raines Court aimed to avoid through the vote nullification standard.188 
An improved, narrower standard would instead require legislators to 
identify an enumerated institutional power that has been unlawfully 
curtailed. This standard adopts as its foundational premise that legislatures 
are bodies with limited, “checklist” powers.189 Because legislatures are 
given these powers, they should not be unlawfully deprived of exercising 
their delegated legislative role.190 And where such deprivations occur, 
legislators, like any other injured plaintiff, should have the option of 
vindicating the affected power. If a legislator can identify an enumerated 
institutional power that has been unlawfully curtailed, then the legislator 
satisfies Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement. 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, discussed in Part I.B.2, provides an example of how the 
proposed standard might be applied. The Arizona State Legislature asserted 
that the state’s voter-created independent redistricting commission violated 
the Elections Clause, which states that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in 
each State by the Legislature thereof,”191 because the commission abridged 
the legislature’s constitutionally endowed redistricting power.192 Under the 
proposed standard, this allegation should warrant standing, because it 
identifies a constitutionally enumerated responsibility that the Arizona 
electorate has removed, arguably unconstitutionally, from the legislature.193 
Importantly, this standard would preserve the core of Raines while not 
extending Raines’s vote nullification standard to legislator injuries for 
which the standard is ill suited. In instances in which legislators seek to 
remedy what they perceive as failed execution of enacted law, Raines 
should continue to apply, as there is no enumerated right a legislature 
188 See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text. 
189 See Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review: The 
Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1987) (“Article I, section 8’s language forms a 
checklist that invests Congress with specific powers rather than a more general, open-ended 
authority . . . . This checklist structure necessarily implies a limitation on congressional authority.”). 
190 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (“It must have been the intention 
of those who gave [Congress] these powers, to insure, so far as human prudence could insure, their 
beneficial execution.”). 
191 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
192 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658–59 (2015). 
193 Of course, this does not mean that the Elections Clause provides the relief the Arizona 
legislature seeks, but only that the legislature has standing to bring suit. See id. at 2677 (ruling against 
the legislators, notwithstanding having recognized their standing to sue). 
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possesses in seeing the law executed.194 On the other hand, if legislators can 
identify an enumerated right, it should not matter if they cannot also 
identify a nullified vote.195 This would not overrule Raines, but merely 
recognize that Raines does not limit cognizable injuries exclusively to vote 
nullification. 
Despite providing significant clarity and simplicity to the legislator 
standing doctrine, the proposed standard may nevertheless present a few 
different challenges. First, it may be difficult in some instances to 
differentiate between deprivation of an opportunity to vote, on the one 
hand, and dissatisfaction with execution of an enacted law, on the other.196 
Legislators will likely be tempted to describe every perceived injury in 
terms of a deprived voting opportunity, whether such deprivation exists or 
not. To that end, the proposed standard will increase, at a more general 
level, the number of instances in which legislators have standing to sue, 
which will thrust courts more frequently into resolving disputes that have 
traditionally caused uneasiness.197 To the extent this uneasiness is well 
founded, it will only increase under the proposed standard. Finally, outside 
of deprivation of an opportunity to vote and other outright elimination of 
legislative functions, courts may struggle to discern what constitutes 
“abridgement” of a legislative right.198 The problems that have plagued the 
courts in defining “adequacy” and “concreteness” for private plaintiffs 
under Article III may also plague future considerations of legislator 
standing.199 
Other justiciability considerations, while perhaps insufficient to 
respond to these problems entirely, should help courts weed out claims by 
194 For a recent article elaborating this point, see generally Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of 
Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1312 (2014) (arguing that Congress cannot represent the United 
States in court in place of the Executive, as Article I grants Congress no power to enforce or defend 
federal laws). 
195 For a discussion of the vote nullification standard’s underinclusiveness, see supra notes 158–62 
and accompanying text. 
196 For example, the legislator plaintiffs in Campbell v. Clinton, see discussion supra notes 76–79 
and accompanying text, argued that they had been deprived of an opportunity to vote on whether 
military action should continue in Kosovo. Because the legislature had considered and ratified actions 
President Clinton had taken, however, the legislators’ injury was arguably nothing more than 
dissatisfaction with executive action, or an attempt to remedy a lost vote. 
197 For an analysis of this uneasiness in the Court’s decision in Raines, see supra notes 153–57 and 
accompanying text.  
198 Dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc in Kerr, Judge Tymkovich 
pointed out that while the legislature cannot directly enact tax measures under TABOR, it can still vote 
and refer measures to the voters. Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 759 F.3d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(Tymkovich, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the Colorado legislature’s core functions of legislation and 
appropriation were arguably not “abridged.” 
199 See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
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legislator plaintiffs that should not reach the merits.200 First, by leaning 
more heavily on Article III’s traceability and redressability requirements, 
courts can ensure that failed execution claims masquerading as deprivations 
of opportunities to vote are declared nonjusticiable. This is because, as the 
Court itself recognized in Raines, certain legislative injuries will not be 
traceable to Executive action,201 nor will judicial remedy provide a 
solution.202 Additionally, courts might rely on the ripeness doctrine to fence 
out some unwanted suits. If some plausible legislative action remains 
available to legislator plaintiffs, a court might prudently await the results of 
that action.203 Finally, the political question doctrine should continue to 
render many suits by legislators nonjusticiable. While the doctrine should 
not bar legislator suits outright,204 there are many suits to which the doctrine 
will apply. Kerr is a prime example, as the Court has long held the 
Guarantee Clause involves nonjusticiable political questions.205 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has proposed a larger role for so-called legislator lawsuits, 
arguing for more open access to courts when legislators sue in their 
institutional capacities. This position reflects the notion that legislators are 
not so different from private plaintiffs such that Article III should not apply 
200 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. While it might seem pointless to resist using 
standing doctrine—or more specifically, the injury-in-fact requirement—to do what other justiciability 
considerations accomplish anyway, the resulting clarity is desirable at least in part because it clarifies 
what Article III requires, and what it does not. This is one teaching of the Court’s effort in Lexmark to 
recategorize certain prudential standing requirements as constitutionally based. See supra note 40. 
201 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 n.11 (1997) (remarking that the legislators’ injuries may also 
not have been traceable to the President’s action). In these instances, even if legislators can somehow 
show that they have suffered an injury in fact, that injury will not be fairly traceable to Executive 
action, but rather to the fact that their legislative colleagues voted and passed a measure. While 
legislators’ minority-party status should not deprive them of justiciability at the injury stage, see supra 
notes 174–78 and accompanying text, it may nonetheless affect whether their claims satisfy Article III’s 
traceability requirement. 
202 Redressability might require courts to discard legislators’ suits in two important ways. First, it 
may simply be impossible to formulate a remedy to address an alleged constitutional violation in 
executing a particular law where significant policymaking is required. Second, even if a court were to 
provide a remedy, it seems possible that some constitutional or legislative or executive action could 
negate the judicial remedy provided by changing the law or adopting a different policy. 
203 Courts should not hold minority-party plaintiffs to impossible standards, see supra notes 174–
78, but if legitimate recourse remains for legislator plaintiffs to pursue, the ripeness doctrine might 
counsel abstention until that recourse is no longer available. 
204 To hold otherwise would flatly contravene Coleman and finds no support in Raines. 
205 See supra note 57; see Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 759 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (advocating for dismissal after taking note of a “long[] history of failed efforts to develop 
standards for litigating Guarantee Clause cases involving individual citizen initiatives”). It bears 
repeating that the Kerr plaintiffs raised other statutory causes of action that do not have the same 
history. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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to them. Rather, legislators are injured in a manner that should warrant 
standing when legislators seek to do the jobs they were elected to do. 
Skepticism about the role of the judiciary in deciding suits brought by 
legislators in their official capacities is not misplaced. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Raines correctly reflected the notion that suits between 
the Executive and Congress will typically be better left to resolution by 
direct confrontation, rather than through the courts. 
It does not follow from Raines, however, that legislators should only 
have standing to sue whenever they can demonstrate a nullified vote. 
Rather, legislators should have standing to sue in their official capacities to 
vindicate exercise of their enumerated powers. In particular, if We the 
People expect our legislators to promote the general welfare of our states 
and country, prudential concerns of the judiciary should not bar them from 
seeking relief in order to do so, especially if our unconstitutional initiatives 
stand in their way. 
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